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Am I a number or aperson? The need to explore and to
understand the nature of personhood is at a critical watershed in our
history. _There are several reasons for this: the moral eonflicts over
abortion, euthanasia, sexual orientation, capital punishment, political
correctness, and genetic engineering; the denial of personhood
(i.e., human dignity) in the expanding pockets of bigotry throughout
the world; the increasing destruetion of persons in aets of violence,
even extending to the frigthening phenomenon of ten-year-olds
murdering toddlers; the disturbing inerease in drug use and suicide
among teenagers; the bureaucratic reduction of persons to statistics;
the eroding of the spiritual self and community in a hedonistic,
narcissistic, and secular society; the dependence on social and
government agencies to fill the gaps created by the loss of family ties
and individual responsibility; the manlpulative power of mass media;
and the social-science reductions of persons to problems of having.
While there are voices who speak out against this rising tide of
dehumanization and depersonalization, one of the most important
goes almost unknown in the United States: Gabriel Marcei. His
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insightful warnings about the dangers of technology and the
reduction of persons to problems (i.e., persons reduced to things in
the world 01 having) are almost prophetie sinee they were written
decades ago. But Mareel ofters more than just warnings; he provides
a hopeful vision of the mystery of personhood as emerging from
experiences of availability, communion, and presence.
The preceding words were composed during a late Friday
evening flight from Nashville, Tennessee, to Washington, D.C. On
Saturday morning, as I wandered around the D.C. Mall area, I
encounted two radieally different experiences of persons: the
Holocaust Museum, which testifies to one of the most chilling
reductions of persons to things (i.e., things to IIbe disposed ofll) in
recent history, and the Viet Nam War Memorial, which witnesses to the
mystery of that sacred relationship between a person and his name.
As I encoun-tered each, Marcel's warnings about the problem of
having ·and his promises concerning the mystery of being provided
excellent onto ogical foundations for exploring these radically
different views of persons. I turn first to Marcel and then to the two
memorials.
According to Marcel, a person cannot have a body, at least not
in the same sense as having (possessing) a car or a house. While one
cannot have a body, it is one's body that provides part of the
foundation for having, a point that Marcel makes in Being and Having:
"1 cannot therefore say that I have a body, at least not properly
speaking, but the mysterious relation uniting me to my body is at the
foundation of all my powers of having ..."1 Marcel's insight is twofold.
First, the relationship that exists between a person and his body is a
mystery, not a problem, i.e., not a relationship of having. Having
requires objectification, reduction, and disposability. So mysteriously
intimate is the relationship between a person and his body that it
cannot, in a healthy manner, be treated like an object: e.g., one
cannot dispose of it in the same manner that he can dispose of an old
car. Certainly there are mental abberations which result in a person's
treating his body as a thing: masochism may be a prime example.
However, for the healthy personality the body is more than a thing. If
1Being and Having, Ir. K. Farrer (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1965), p. 84. Hereafter BH.
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Marcel is correct on this point, it follows that it is both unhealthy and
immoral for any person to treat anothers body as an object or a thing,
which is exactly the mode of having that is fundamental to slavery,
bigotry, and pornography.
Second, fundamental to any act of having which extends to
persons is the reduction of a person to a thing, the power to dispose
of things, and techniques of degradation, which function to destroy
self-respect and reduce persons to "waste products," a point Marcel
discusses in Man Against Mass Society.
... I understand by "techniques of degradation" a whole body
of methods deliberately pul into operation in order to attack
and destroy in human persons . . . their self-respect, and . . .
to transform them little by IiUle into mere human waste
products, conscious of themselves as such, and in the end
forced to despair of themselves ... in the very depths of their
souls.2
The IItechniques of degradation" are many and so weil known that
they need not be examined at this point. The spiritual-psychological-
emotional cost to the person, now the thing who can be disposed of,
· is also weil known. What is not as weil known, however, is the tragedy
of the "haver", the possessor, the disposer: a tragedy seen when we
realize that to possess is to be possessed.
In a passage in Creative Fidelity, Marcel hints at the deeper
"tragedy of havingU for the haver, the possessor: IIWhy, then, did I
write: 'Whatever can be catalogued is an occasion for despair?' an
observation which I believe is very important since in it may be
discerned the root of what I have been led to call the tragedy of
having"3 Having involves cataloguing, i.e., reducing to definitive'
categories. While both bigotry and slavery are excellent examples of
reducing persons to catalogued things, the Nazi cataloguing of
Jewish prisoners daily added to the "Final SolutionIl offers an
2Man Against Mass Society, tr. G.S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1967), p. 42. Hereafter MMS.
3Creative Fidelity, tr. R. Rosthai (New York: Noonday Pr., 1964), p.
70. Hereafter CF.
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especially chilling example of the reduction of persons to things to be
disposed of, of the technological problem of finding more efficient
and cost-effective means of disposing of bodies, and of the tragedy
of having.
The manner in which the Nazi was also a victim of the tragedy of
having is worthy of additional comment. At the very moment that the
58 member was disposing of the bodies of Jewish prisoners, he was
disposing of his own human spirit, that is, he was reducing hissoul to a
thing possessed by his distorted ideas, values, and beliefs. This is
why the extreme passion for possessing is ultimately one of the forms
that fanaticism takes, as Marcel recognizes in Being and Having.
I am thinking in particular of such pseudo-possessions as my
ideas and opinions. In this ease, the word "have" takes on a
meaning which is ... threatening. The more I treat my own
ideas . . . as something be/onging to me--and so as something I
am proud of·-the more surely will these ideas ... tend, by their
very inertia ... to exereise a tyrannical power over me; that is
the prineiple of fanaticism in all its shapes. (BH, 166)
Fanaticism is always reductive, that is, the fanatic necessarily
catalogues and abstracts: ideas become possessions, truth becomes
inertia, and persons are reduced to "disposablen things, a
disposability tragically evidenced in the Holocaust Museum.
There is, however, another realm of personhood: the realm of
being. One of the avenues into this realm is through the mystery of
the sacred relationship between a person and his name. In a social
context, everyone has a name. Certainly names may have different
meanings in different social contexts and may even be changed, but
everyone has a name. Even though one may change his name as
weil as change his automobile, a person does not have a name in the
same way that he has a car. According to Marcel, 11••• the name lies
at the intersection . . . of being and having. It signals more than it
signifies the unique place which belongs to the individual in the whole
in which he has to find his place and discover the type of creative
activity ... which is his ownl'.4 A personls name is not only something
4The Mystery of Being, Vol. I: Reflection and Mystery, tr. G.S. Fraser
(Chicago: Gateway Edition, 1960), p. 62. Hereafter MBI.
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that he has--it separates hirn from others--but it is also part of who he
iso For example, one's name on a class roll can be treated objectively
when the teacher calls it and expects the response "pre.sent.n On the
other hand, when a loved one calls a person's name, it becomes more
than just an object; indeed, it becomes a call to experience a
presence, a mystery. Understood from this perspective, it is not
surprising to note that one of the techniques of degradation basic
tobigotry is the denial of the value of a person's name. As Marcel
indicates, a name lies at an intersection that divides persons into
things or mysteries.
In silent, agonizing, and ineffable sacredness the Viet Nam War
Memorial witnesses to the mysteries of eommunion, presenee, and '
availability that help to create the depth of personhood, espeeially as
that depth is revealed in the meaning and value of a name. The
passionate, heartrending engraving on blaek marble of the names of
thousands of young men and women who died in the killing fields of
Viet Nam constitute the eontroversial Wall of the Memorial. Tears,
memories, fears, loves, hopes, longings, griefs, loneliness, anger,
and, above all, remembered intimacies are evoked in the presence of
the Viet Nam War Memorial. As the Memorial grows to a height several
feet beyond one's head, the terrible list of riames goes on and on--
the dreadful and tragie loss is overpowering. As one looks at the
names, something amazing and mysterious happens: suddenly he
sees his face re'fleeted in the polished black marble along with the
ongoing list of nartles. In this experienee a poignant truth is revealed:
as human beings we share a solidarily that makes the loss of any
human life an aet that diminishes us all. The Viet Nam War Memorial is
a testimony to the mysteries of eommunion, presence, and availability
that are eneountered through love, a love that reaches out even to
those who are beyond spaee and time.
In Marcel·s terms, the Viet Nam War Memorial indicates that the
signifieance of personhood is to be found in eommunion, in the ·We"
rather than the Cartesian "I":
At the root of existence there is first the recognition of a uHere I
amfu-·exclamation as the soul of the existential ... But this
UHere I ami" is treated as the manifestation of a ufor itself,1I ...
The, IIfor itselfll can be understood orily as a participation: to
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exist is to co-exist.5
From the moment of conception, a co-participation, the human being
is always related to something olher than himself: 10 be means to be
with. In Creative Fidelity, Marcel comments on how fundamentally
being is dependent upon being with when he writes: 11 ••• I
communicate effectively with myself only insofar as 1communicate
with the other person ... 11 (CF, 34). Even self-knowledge and
communication depend upon the existence of the other.6
In his lecture on "Ontological Exigencell at the University of
Aberdeen, Marcel begins by restating the significance of communion
(intersubjectivity, i.e., internal relationships between persons) for
human existence:
We have already seen that the more my existence takes on the
character of including others, the narrower becomes the gap
which separates it from being; the more, in other words, I am ..
. There is a sense in which it is literally true to say that the more
exclusively it is 1 who· exist, the less do 1 exist; and
conversely, the more I free myself from the prison of ego-
centricism, the more do I exist.7
In other words, Marcel's metaphysic of being is lIessentially anti-
cartesianll : IIBut to take up such a position immediately throws into
relief the essentially anti-cartesian character of [my] metaphysic ... [It]
is a metaphysic of we are as opposed to a metaphysic of I thin/('
(MBlI., 10). Unlike so much of modern metaphysics, influenced by
Descartes' cogito (the "1 that thinksll), Marcel is claiming that the
fundamental human experience and awareness of existence is
5Presence and Immorta/ity, trI M.A. Machado (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
U. Pr., 1967), p. 205. Hereafter PI.
6 If loneliness is the absence of meaningful, communicating human
relationships, and suicide is the result of loneliness combined with
hopelessness, it is not surprising that those who work with attempted
suicides find that they have great difficulty communicating not only with
others but also with themselves.
7The Mystery of Being, Vol. //: Faith and Rea/ity, tr. G.S. Fraser
(Chicago: Gateway Edition, 1960), pp. 37-8. Hereafter MBit
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communal: "Would not the true existential movement always be the
gaining of an access to a 'we,' or to an 'ours'... Existence in its higher
forms is inseparable from intersubjectivity" (PI, 201-02).
By beginning with a metaphysics of we rather than the
Cartesian starting point of I, Marcel avoids the paths of both dualism
and solipsism into which much Cartesian thinking leads. There is no
lonely, isolated I that is the foundation of metaphysics; rather the we
is already in each of US, in Marcel's words:
... the intersubjective is really within the subject himself, that
each one is for himself a "we," that he can be himself only in
being many, and that value is possible only on this condition ..
. My own [Ioved ones] are not only represented in me, they are
part of my very being (... I am neither alone, nor ane). (PI,
210)
It is the WB in each one of us that makes communion (intersubjectivity)
possible. When the we that is in esch one of us responds to the gift
of intimacy, Marcel states that a communion is evoked that frees us
from the power of egocentrism and creates an "openness"
(availability) and "spirituality" that transcend even communion:
There can be no authentie depth exeept where there can be
real communion; but there will never be any real communion
between individuals centred on themselves . . . The very
notion of intersubjectivity presupposes a reeiprocal openness
between individuals without which no kind of spirituality is
conceivable. (MMS, 267)
Many philosophies, theologies, political ideologies, and ethical
systems have aftirmed the dignity of human life. Often this human
dignity has been based on the affirmation of persons, i.e., affirming
the value of each individual life. While affirmation of the individual
person is a respectable value, to base human dignity on the
affirmation of the self is to commit another Cartesian mistake. The
value of the individual person is not based on the seit (the I) but must
be founded upon our shared humanness, Le., upon the WB that is
within each person. In The Existential Background of Human Dignity,
Marcel argues that human dignity is grounded "not on the affirmation
of the self and the pretensions it exudes, but on a stronger
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consciousness of the Iiving tie which unites all menu. 8 In other words,
the we within takes us beyond ourselves, i.e., experiences of
communion provide a spiritual foundation for transcending the self-
contained ego.
Inevitably, when a thau relationship (cornrnunion) is not
maintained, the relationship deteriorates into uncertainty, doubt, lies,
jealousy, anger, and, sometimes, hate. On the other hand, when a
thou relationship (i.e., a relationship of intimacy between two persons)
is established and maintained, the consequences are self-discovery,
joy, growth, love, belief, freedorn, and hope. All of these
consequences are experiences of persons as mysteries rather than
problems (things). For Marcel, the I-thou relationship (cornmunion) is
essential for the growth and nurture of the person: uThe
indistinctness of the land thou . . . does not imply the existence of a
neutral environment in which one can lose oneself and abdicate, so to
speak; on the contrary, it is a kind of vital milieu for the soul from which
the soul draws its strength and where it is renewed by testing itself"
(CF, 35). In order to explore the nature of an I-thou relationship
(communion), it is necessary to examine Marcel's thoughts on
presence and availability because communion is actualized through
both.
There are several issues that Marcel explores concerning
presence, availability, and cornmunion. First, although there is a
human tendency to treat presence as a problem capable of analysis,
definition, and measurement, a true experience of presence goes
beyond the problematic realms of having and techniques. Marcel
addresses this tendency in Being and Having: "Consider presence
as something of which I cannot dispose in any way; which I cannot
possess. There is a constant ternptation to turn it into an object, or to
treat it as an aspect of myself" (BH, 146). Either ternptation. to turn
presence into an object (a problem) or into an aspect of the self,
distorts the nature of presence. In Marcel's words, "... as soon as
there is presence, we have gone beyond the realrn of problem" (BH,
115). To recognize that presence cannot be treated as an object (as a
problem) is to realize that presence is not apossession of the self (the
8The Existential Background of Human Dignity (Cambridge: Howard U.
Pr., 1963), p. 135. Hereafter EBD.
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subject). Rather presence is an encounter between two subjects: 11••
. there cannot be an encounter ... except between beings endowed
with a certain inwardness..." (MBI, 169). Encounter is the key term
here. Problems are confronted, i.e., placed in front 0' one;
presences are encountered (en =within), a point Marcel clarifies in
The Philosophy of Existentialism:
When I say that a being is granted to me as a presenee or as a
being ... this means that I am unable to treat him as if he were
merely plaeed in front of me; between him and me there arises
a relationship whieh, in asense, surpasses my awareness of
him; he is not only before me, he is also within me ...9
Second, presence cannot be separated from mystery (the
reverse mayaiso be true), and every experience of presence is also
one of communion (intersubjectivity). In his Aberdeen Lectures,
Marcel describes the necessary relation between presence and
mystery:
... we diseern an organie eonneetion between presenee and
mystery. For, in the first place, every presence is mysterious
and, in the second place, it is very doubtful whe'ther the word
"mystery" can be properly used in the ease where a presence
is not, at the very least, making itself somehow feit. (MBI, 266)
Marcel indicates in several passages that the mystery of presence is
the mystery of communion. The tollowing passage tram Presence
and Immortality is a representative example:
... presence is intersubjective. It cannot but be interpreted as
the expression of a will which seeks to reveal itself to me; but
this revelation supposes that I do not put an obstacle in its
way. In short, the sUbject is treated, not like an object, but as
the magnetie center 01 presence. At the root of presence there
is a being who takes me into consideration, who is regarded by
me as taking me into account. Now, by definition, an object
does not take me into account; I do not
9The Philosophy of Existentialism, tr. M. Harari (New York: The
Citadel Pr., 1956), p. 38. Hereafter PE.
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exist for it. (PI 153)
Because presence is inseparable from the mystery of communion
(the reverse is also true), like any mystery it can be affirmed (liinvoked
or evoked") or denied (betrayed). In his Aberdeen Lectures, Marcel
states that
. . . a presence must not be thought of as an object . . .
[A]presence is something which can only be gathered to
oneself or shut out from oneself, be welcomed or rebuffed ...
A presence can, in the last analysis, only be invoked or
evoked ... (MBI, 255-56)
In other words, presence can only be offered as a free gift and
received as a ffee offefing, thus, presence cannot be separated from
availability.
Third, presence requires availability. Although presence
cannot be measured or adequately defined (i.e., turned into an
abstraction), according to Marcel the experience of presence is
revealed in those manifold ways that one person becomes available to
another:
Presence is something which reveals itself immediately and
unmlstakably in a look, a smile, an intonation. . .. the person
who is ... [available] is the one who is capable of being with me
with the whole of himself when I am in need ... Presence
involves a reciprocity which is excluded from any relation of
sUbject to object ... (PE, 40)
Because presence depends upon availability, it is something that
cannot be claimed, demanded, forced, manufactured by willpower, or
purchased. Presence can only be accepted as a gift freely given; in
Marcel's words: IIPresence is response to the act by which the
subject opens himself to receive; in this sense it is the gift of oneself.
Presence belongs only to the being who is capable of giving himself"
(PI, 153). In other words, only persons are capable of availability.
Things or persons reduced to things are incapable of availability.
Interestingly, the two most debilitating forms of persons reduced to
things are self-reductions: 'neither the narcissist nor the masochist is
capable of availability.
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Finally, presence is revelation. Not only does presence reveal
communi~n, mystery, love, creativity, and availability, but it also
reveals "me to myself," a thema Marcal emphasizes at Aberdeen:
"When somebody·s presence really does make itself feit, it can
refresh my inner being; it reveals me to myself, it makes me more fully
myself than I should be if I were not exposed to its impactll (MBI, 252- .
53). From Marcel's perspective, there is no ··more fatal error"
concerning the human personality than that made by both Descartes
and Sartre: the reduction of persons to ego-states of thinking or
individual actions and decisions. In Homo Viator, Marcel corrects this
error by describing the personality (self) as a gift:
Maybe there is no more fatal error than that which conceives of
the~ as the secret abode of originality. To get a better idea
of this we must here introduce 'the wrongly discredited notion of .
gifts. The best part of my personality does not belong to me. I
am in no sense the owner, only the trustee . .. Indeed, if we
come to thlnk of it, there is nothing in me which cannot or
should not be regarded as a gift.10
Understood in this manner, the human person (personality)
has, so to speak, two parents: inner urges, needs, instincts,
understandings, genetics, and talents and those presences which
creatively ofter themselves in acts of communion. Only a fool claims to
be a seIt-made person. Instead, our personalities (selves) are born
and grow out of that intersubjective interaction between the inner self
and other selves who become present to us and, therefore, become
apart of uso In other words, we become persons through the
mysteries of communion, availability, and presence, which are most
clearly experienced in love, faith, hope, wonder, joy, and laughter.
Austin Peay State University ALBERT RANDALL
10Homo Vistor, tr. E. Crawford (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965),
p. 19. Hereafter HV.
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